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Instruction for HeaIthcare Administrators 
by Most Reverend John J. Myers, J.e.D., Bishop of Peoria 
Questions concerning the end of human life provoke uncertainty today 
in the healthcare field and contradiction in the legal field. I With increasing 
urgency such questions call for our attention, both because of their 
frequency and because of the rapidly changing legal environment. Soon 
The Patient Self-Determination Act of 19902 will take effect. This Act 
requires, among other things , that all healthcare facilities participating in 
the Medicare or Medicaid programs declare in writing their policies for the 
implementation of any advance directives , such as living wills or durable 
powers of attorney for healthcare, which their patients may present to 
them. 
An advance directive is a legal instrument which becomes operative 
within existing personal relationships. Personal interdependency unites 
the physici;ins and the entire team of health professionals with the patient 
and the patient's family and friends as well as with the healthcare facility 
and the Catholic Church in whose healing mission Catholic facilities share. 
Each in its own way contributes to the good of the patient. 
The Catholic healthcare facility is not a passive and indifferent site for 
the patient-physician relationship. Driven by its mission, the facility takes 
an active role in the delivery of healthcare. The Catholic facility's mission is 
a participation in the healing mission of the Church, an extension of the 
healing mission of Christ. 
Informed by Christ's own view of human life, the Catholic facility joins 
the physician's medical expertise to its own human expertise with a view to 
the relief of suffering. Ideally, the patient and the physician operate within 
the vision of human life proposed by the facility . Still, it may happen that a 
patient or physician seeks a course of treatment which is at odds with the 
teaching incorporated in the policies ofthe Catholic facility. This situation 
has already been addressed with respect to abortion and sterilization. The 
Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Facilities) have 
clearly articulated the Catholic position on these questions. Euthanasia 
frequently opposed by Church teaching,4 is directly condemned in the 
Directives.5 Still, there is need to address explicitly the situations which 
may be created by advance directives, since there may be some doubt 
concerning which principles apply. 
As Catholic healthcare facilities seek to formulate their policies in this 
regard, I wish to offer guidance by reflecting upon the Catholic moral 
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tradition and the role of the Catholic healthcare facility in the physician-
patient relationship. 
I. The Contemporary Situation 
Surely all dedicated to healthcare wish to provided the benefits modern 
medicine makes available to those whose health is weakened and who 
require the assistance of medical technology. It is precisely this will to do 
good for others that creates the hesitancy many experience when they 
apply ·even minimal life-sustaining technology to those unfortunate 
persons who yet live bodily, while their higher human faculties appear to 
have slipped away. 
The questions which confront one facing this situation cut to the deepest 
presuppositions about the meaning of human life: What limit is there to 
what-must be done to preserve my life? May I refuse to preserve my life in 
what I consider to be an inhuman and undignified state? Has technology 
failed to preserve our humanity even as it preserves our lives? Such 
questions touch upon many complex issues: the gift oflife, the inevitability 
of death , the fact of suffering, the power of technology. Our response to 
these questions must be founded upon the same Christian understanding 
of human life which makes the care of the sick and the suffering a concern 
of the Church. 
As theoretical, these questions are vexing enough; facing an actual 
situation where one must determine the future of another person, who may 
be severely debilitated, raises these questions with their full gravity. They 
provoke not only doubt, but also fears and expectations of protracted 
suffering. Death seems to be the only release from an apparent slavery to 
technology, which preserves life but cannot restore health . I have great 
personal concern for those actually facing these problems, as well as for 
those who fear to face them. This moves me to offer guidance founded 
upon both a belief in the sanctity of human life and the recognition that 
death is inevitable and need not be opposed through measures which 
impose terms of life to be feared more than death itself. 
For many people, a general climate of anxiety accompanies any contact 
with the medical profession. It represents both a science, that they may not 
understand, and an art, that may seem to treat the body, which is not 
extrinsic to the person,6 as a thing. Some find medical procedures 
humiliating, and therefore fear the cure as well as the illness. We naturally 
shrink from imagining ourselves suffering any debility, but there is also 
growing anxiety at the prospect of chronic dependence upon the medical 
profession. People especially fear a technologically achieved preservation 
of their lives in a debilitated state. 
The questions we face today are not independent of this climate of 
anxiety. These fears are not to be discounted lightly. Still, we have no 
reason to feel helpless in the face of such fears, as though we were governed 
by them rather than the truth of Christ. Christ offers hope. For while death 
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is certain, in Him it is not final; while suffering is universal, in Him it is not 
empty. The meaning of suffering and death in our life and the lives of those 
we serve depends upon their meaning in the life of Christ Himself.? Christ 
is the Victor over every kind of evil and we symbolize His triumph by the 
Cross upon which He suffered. Death is not the solution to human 
suffering. Rather, Christ is the solution to both suffering and death. Christ 
Himself reveals the truth of human life,s intended for all men and women 
of all traditions .9 This truth, though not simple and sometimes not fully 
clear, is our guide through difficult times and difficult questions; we return 
to it continually in order to bring light to our darkness . 
II. The Catholic Heritage 
At the heart of the Revelation of Christ is the truth that all human life is 
created out of love and in the image and likeness of God. From the first 
through the last moment of earthly existence and beyond , the human 
person never loses this fundamental dignity nor the cradle of divine love in 
which it is created. Human life, which comes from God , belongs to Him 
still , so that we are not our own: we are to glorify God in our bodies lO and 
serve the Creator before any creature. Ii 
Human life and health, therefore, are to be preserved in the service of 
God. In this context, our common theological tradition has spoken of a 
duty to preserve life and health. This duty has never been understood to be 
an absolute duty, as if bodily life were the highest good. Rather, in full 
recognition of the need for earthly life to be completed and perfected in a 
higher life (which is also a bodily life), the fulfillment of this duty to 
preserve life and health has been recognized to ha ve limits. Life and health 
are never to be neglected or attacked, but they need not be defended by any 
and all means. 
For centuries, the question of the means which preserve life and health 
was relatively simple, for the unsophisticated state of medicine created few 
dilemmas. As medicine increased in complexity and proficiency, 
theological reflection upon the meaning of bodily life and the duty to 
preserve it advanced also. Our developing tradition of theological 
reflection has articulated several principles which help us to understand 
the role medical science is to play in our lives. 
III. The Theological Tradition 
The elements of the theological tradition appear in two forms . The 
writings of the theologians present reflections upon Revelation. These 
writings enjoy the authority that they secure for themselves through the 
strength of their own arguments. Second, the statements of the 
Magisterium present normative interpretations of Revelation.These 
statements enjoy varying degrees of authority, evidenced in their form of 
expression, but they must always be regarded as authoritatively giving 
direction to and frequently setting necessary limits to any further discusison, 
February, 1991 39 
In matters of healthcare, both forms of the tradition have appeared. 
Scholastic theologians developed a consistent doctrine for addressing 
questions related to life and health . Additionally, the Magisterium has 
endorsed some elements of this common theological tradition. Relative to 
patient self-determination with respect to advance directives, two 
magisterial documents are of primary importance: "Address to an 
International Congress of Anesthesiologists," November 24, 1957, by Pope 
Pius XII;12 "The Declaration on Euthanasia" by The Sacred Congregation 
for the Doctrine of the Faith.13 
A. Patient Self-Determination 
Pius XII concisely formulates the fundamental consideration: "Natural 
reason and Christian morals say that man (and whoever is entrusted with 
the task of care of his fellowman) has the right and the duty in case of serious 
illness to take the necessary treatment for the preservation of life and 
health."14 The patient's duty to preserve his or her life and the right to the 
means necessary provide the point of departure in any matter of patient 
self-determination. This is so without prejudice to the corresponding rights 
and duties of healthcare professionals, as Pope Pius indicated . 
The Ethical and Religious Directivesfor Catholic Health Facilities, as 
well as standard medical practice, recognize that the initiation, 
continuation, or interruption of any medical procedure deemed permissible 
requires "the consent, at least implied or reasonably presumed, of the 
patient.or his guardians. "15 The need for consent recognizes that the patient 
is director of the actions that will be undertaken in behalf of his or her life 
and health. Nevertheless, "the right to refuse medical treatment is not an 
independent right, but is a corollary to the patient's right and moral 
responsibility to request reasonable treatment."16 In other words, the 
private choice of the individual is not the only factor in the morality of the 
situation. There are objective dimensions of all situations which contribute 
to determining the morality of any choice which is to be made. Chief among 
these objective elements, according to Catholic theology and medical 
practice, is the duty to preserve life . This duty belongs both to the individual 
and, in a different way, to the healthcare facility, as Pope Pius taught. 
Insofar, then, as a healthcare facility is a moral agent, it must not blindly 
follow the directives of another person, but must fulfill each of its duties 
with conscious responsibility to its mission and to the moral teachings of the 
Church. Compliance with the wishes of a given patient is thus limited by the 
moral nature of the healthcare facility itself. Accordingly, our Catholic 
policy is to respect and comply with all informed and conscientious requests 
for, or refusals of, medical assistance, unless it involves some moral 
irresponsibility for the facility, some failure in its duties to the well-being of 
the patient.'7 Ultimately, responsibility for the moral uprightness of the 
facility lies with the Administrator. That is, without normally being 
personally involved in the patient-physician relationship, the Administrator 
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sees that the policies and customary practices of the facility are formed 
according to Catholic principles. 
The conviction that the limits of our compliance are actually founded 
upon the truth of human life, and therefore, that they are genuinely directed 
toward the patient's best interests, gives us confidence to adhere to our 
principles and to refuse to comply. This does not mean that we impose our 
beliefs upon patients in violation of their decisions. Rather, we respect the 
right and duty of the patient to self-determination. At the same time we 
avoid complicity in activities contrary to our long moral tradition. And we 
recognize that we also act rightly by not allowing the beliefs of another to be 
imposed upon us. 
B. End of Life Decisions 
At the end oflife, a patient may exercise the right to self-determination in 
more than one way. If the patient is competent, he or she retains the full 
authority to direct the plan of treatment. If incompetent, one of many 
possibilities may ensue. Advance directives are legal instruments, such as 
living wills and durable powers of attorney for healthcare, which specify the 
conditions under which they become operative. In the absence of an 
operative legal document, decisions may be made by other interested 
persons, usually families, friends or guardians, or at times by doctors, or 
through court processes. 18 
The limits of our willingness to comply with end of life decisions are 
supplied by our understanding of euthanasia: "an action or an omission 
which of itself or by intention causes death, in order that all suffering may in 
this way be eliminated ."19 Thus, euthanasia "in all its forms is forbidden . 
The failure to supply the ordinary means of preserving life is equivalent to 
euthanasia. However, neither the physician nor the patient is obliged to the 
use of extraordinary means."20 Because it is not always clear in a particular 
case what constitutes euthanasia, the Church has presented an explicit and 
authoritative statement. 
C. The Declaration on Euthanasia 
The Catholic theological tradition developed a doctrine concerning the 
duty to preserve life by distinguishing between ordinary and extraordinary 
means. Ordinary means are normally deemed obligatory, while extra-
ordinary means normally involve some grave burden or disproportion 
between themselves and the benefits they secure. Pius XII gave 
authoritative expression to such a distinction21 and The Sacred 
Congregation for the Doctrine ofthe Faith developed, with slight linguistic 
revision, our understanding of the distinction in the 1980 "Declaration on 
Euthanasia. " 
At the outset it is to be noted, as the "Declaration" teaches, that the 
complexity of the situation may make it difficult to apply ethical principles. 
It is necessary to advert both to the principles and to the peculiarity of an 
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individual case. Accordingly, the judgment about the use of therapeutic 
means belongs "to the conscience of the sick person, or of those qualified to 
speak in the sick person's name, or of the doctors."22 
The "Declaration" teaches: 
Everyone has the duty to care for his or her own health or to seek such care from 
others. Those whose task it is to care for the sick must do so conscientiously23 and 
administer the remedies that seem necessary or useful. 
The first consideration, as Pius XII also taught, is to preserve life24 and 
health. The first obligation, the presumption, if you will, is that everyone 
care for his or her health . If a person is unable to fulfill this duty, he or she 
still has the duty to seek such care from others. In the event of sickness, 
others have the duty to care for the sick person and to administer necessary 
or useful remedies . The existence of each of these duties is not something 
which needs to be proven. These evident duties are the foundation of the 
discussion. 
With this established, the Congregation considers whether it is 
"necessary in all circumstances to have recourse to all possible remedies." In 
brief, the reply is that there is no obligation to use extraordinary or 
disproportionately burdensome means. To clarify the meaning of these 
terms, the "Declaration" teaches: 
In any case, it will be possible to make a correct judgment as to the means by 
studying the type of treatment to be used , its degree of complexity or risk, its cost 
and the possibilities of using it , and comparing these elements with the result that 
can be expected, taking into account the state of the sick person and his or her 
physical and moral resources . 
Thus, in a particular case, those means are deemed non-obligatory whose 
expected results for this given patient are disproportionate to the type of 
treatment, or to the degree of complexity or risk, or to the cost, or to the 
availability of the means in question. 
It must not be overlooked that the Congregation begins with the certain 
duty to preserve life and health and then shows how to recognize means 
which are exceptional in the fulfillment of the duty. In other words, in the 
event of illness, ourfirst response is that the duty to preserve life or health is 
J 
to be fulfilled by means which are necessary or useful. If the use of those 
means is seen to be disproportionately burdensome according to the terms 
ofthe "Declaration", they need not be employed or may be interrupted. Let 
there be no mistake: if a means is necessary or useful for the preservation of 
life or health, the obligation to use it exists unless it is shown to be 
disproportionately burdensome in the particular situation.25 
According to the teaching of the "Declaration", the obligation to use the 
means which are necessary or useful is more fundamental than the option 
not to use them. For the obligation to use life-preserving means depends 
upon the certain duty to preserve life and health. On the other hand, the 
option not to use the means depends upon their being shown to impose 
burdens disproportionate to their benefits. Therefore, when it is not 
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immediately clear whether the use of therapeutic means is dispropor-
tionately burdensome, it is not an entirely open question whether or not 
such means are to be employed. The presumption is that the necessary or 
useful means are to be employed unless there is evidence that the means are 
optional, according to the terms of the "Declaration". 
The "Declaration" offers some clarifications to facilitate the application 
of these general principles: 
Ifthere are not other sufficient remedies, it is permitted, with the patient's consent, 
to have recourse to the means provided by the most advanced medical techniques, 
even if these means are still at the experimental stage and are not without a certain 
risk . . . 
It is also permitted, with the patient's consent , to interrupt these means, where the 
results fall short of expectations . .. 
It is also permissible to make do with the normal means that medicine can offer. 
Therefore one cannot impose on anyone the obligation to have recourse to a 
technique which is already in use but which carries a risk or is burdensome.26 
The first two clarifications share the common presupposition of a case 
where "the normal means that medicine can offer" are not "sufficient." 
These clarifications state that in such a case, it is permitted to employ 
advanced medical techniques and it is permitted to interrupt them if the 
results are less than expected . The third clarification states that it is always27 
permitted not to have recourse to the advanced means at all. 
The "Declaration" adds a separate clarification for specific circum-
stances: 
When inevitable death is imminent in spite of the means used , it is 'permitted in 
conscience to take the decision to refuse forms oftreatment that would only secure 
a precarious and burdensome prolongation of life, so long as the normal care due 
to the sick person in similar cases is not interrupted. 
It must be emphasized that this "decision to refuse" depends upon the 
imminence of death "in spite of the means used."28 The "Declaration" 
teaches that we do not determine that death is imminent by considering the 
state of the person independent of the use of the means. That is, if the means 
are effective to preserve life, death is not imminent. No one should apply the 
terms of this qualification to a case where death is not imminent in spite of 
the means used. 
Also it should be noted that the phrase "burdensome prolongation of 
life" recalls an earlier passage in the "Declaration": 
Ultimately, the word euthanasia is used in a more particular sense to mean 'mercy 
killing', for the purpose of putting an end to extreme suffering, or saving abnormal 
babies, the mentally ill or the incurably sick from the prolongation, perhaps for 
many years, of a miserable life , which could impose too heavy a burden on their 
families or on society. 
The contrast between the parallel phrases (prolongation of a miserable life 
vs . burdensome prolongation of life )29 points to a subtle distinction which 
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is precisely the heart of the matter. It is euthanasia to intend to bring an end 
(through action or omission) to human life which is burdensome or 
miserable. It is not euthanasia to bring an end to a burdensome means of 
prolonging life. 
Finally, it should be restated that, in those cases where death is not 
imminent and the means which are available for use are effective in the 
conservation of life, there can be tremendous difficulty in determining in the 
particular case what means one is strictly required to use as opposed to 
those means one is permitted either to use or to refuse. It is not possible to 
identify a given technical means and to classify it as always and in all 
circumstances obligatory. The final decision is contingent upon the 
circumstances of the individ ual cases and rests with the consciences of the 
patient or those who act in the patient's behalf.'30 
IV. Application of the "Declaration on Euthanasia" 
for Administrators of Catholic Healthcare Facilities 
Applying the principles formulated in the "Declaration on Euthanasia" 
to end of life decisions is not easy. The principles have been stated by the 
Church to help individuals and institutions arrive at a correct formation of 
conscience. Still, it is difficult to see clearly all aspects of the question. No 
one should underestimate the intricacy and the peculiarity of individual 
cases. Allow me, then, to summarize the essential points relative to the 
"Declaration" for Administrators of healthcare facilities making policies 
and decisions concerning the implementation of end of life directives. 
1. It is the function of the Administrator to ensure that the practices of 
the healthcare facility follow the guidelines of the" Declaration." Normally, 
this is done at the level of policy. In rare cases, the Administrator, with the 
counsel oft rusted personnel, may be required to determine whether a given 
advance directive or other medical order here and now conflicts with stated 
policy or with Catholic teaching. Normally we can comply, but in the case 
of an evident violation, the Administrator refuses compliance. The 
Administrator may thus determine that an individual's request or directive 
is not in harmony with Catholic teaching, or that the individual has 
misunderstood or misapplied the principles. To make this judgment is not 
to accuse any person of wrongdoing or sin.3) It is, rather, to point out an 
error of judgment and to refuse to involve the facility in an activity which 
violates the moral responsibility of the facility. 
2. Perhaps the most troubling end of life decisions concern the refusal or 
removal of artificial nutrition and hydration. On the one hand, it is difficult 
to assert an obligation that a person live in a debilitated state for what may 
be a long time. On the other hand, it is unsettling to assert that a person may 
die of starvation under medical supervision. This issue does not admit of 
easy resolution, as evidenced by the ongoing medical, ethical, theological 
and legal debates. The fact that the "Declaration on Euthanasia" did not 
address this issue in particular does not mean that the general principles it 
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articulated do not apply to questions of artificial nutrition and hydration. 
On the contrary, in the absence of a specific treatment of this issue, it is 
imperative to understand how the general principles articulated in the 
"Declaration" apply to this question. 
It should be noted that it is essentially irrelevant whether artificial 
nutrition and hydration are to be considered parts of normal care or forms 
of medical treatment. All means of preserving life or health, whether 
normal care or medical therapy, are subject to the analysis described in the 
"Declaration on Euthanasia." The moral obligation to use a given means 
does not arise exclusively from the nature of the means, for one must also 
consider the circumstances of the case. That is, even aspects of normal care, 
under extreme circumstances, may be extraordinary or disproportionate in 
a particular situation. It is not true morally to say that artificial nutrition 
and hydration must be applied under any and all circumstances. The moral 
assessment of the case does not take away from, but rather depends upon, 
the physician's expertise. Only in light of the circumstances of the particular 
case does it become possible to determine what is necessary or useful and 
what is disproportionate. 
Food and water are always necessary, but a given means of artificial 
nutrition and hydration may not be necessary because other, more normal 
means for the provision of nutrients are sufficient. Food and water are 
always useful for a living being. Still, a given means of artificial nutrition 
and hydration may not be useful in cases where the body is chronically 
incapable of assimilating the nutrients32 which are provided in this manner. 
In such cases, when artificial means fail to deliver nutrients in a manner in 
which they may be assimilated, artificial nutrition and hydration are, 
properly speaking, useless. Artificial nutrition and hydration are not useless 
in cases where they effectively deliver nutrients but fail to bring about some 
other, indirect benefit, such as the restoration of consciousness. Artificial 
nutrition and hydration are useful for the provision of nutrients and useless 
when they fail to provide nutrients; they are not useless when they fail to 
secure complete recovery from some symptom, pathology, or condition 
extrinsic to the need for nutrients. 
3. The use of therapeutic means is optional, according to the 
"Declaration," when their use imposes burdens which are disproportionate 
to the benefits their use secures. It is essential to note that the proportion in 
question lies between the burdens the means introduce when used and the 
benefits the means achieve. When resorting to medical means, we are 
responsible for the burdens which our intervention imposes. If those 
burdens are excessive in relation to the achievements of the intervention, the 
medical means may be refused or discontinued. However, the use of means 
is not deemed disproportionate due to the presence of burdens or misery 
which arise independent of the medical intervention in question. 33 
Additionally, in cases where death is imminent in spite ofthe means used, 
one need not apply the same standards. For the "Declaration" teaches that 
under the conditions of imminent death in spite of medical intervention it 
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is not necessary to employ means which secure only a burdensome 
prolongation of life. 
4. The "Declaration" teaches: "Those whose task it is to care for the sick 
must do so conscientiously and administer the remedies that seem necessary 
or useful." Catholic healthcare facilities, then , as professional medical 
providers, cannot avoid the duty to provide life-preserving means, 
including artificial nutrition and hydration,34 to those for whom they are 
necessary or useful, unless their provision imposes burdens dispropor-
tionate to its benefits , according to the terms of the 'Declaration'." That is, 
in cases where artificial nutrition and hydration are necessary or useful, 
Catholic health care facilities must apply such means in the fulfillment of 
their duties as described in and subject to the limitations specified in the 
"Declaration on Euthanasia." Limits to the fulfillment ofthe certain duty to 
preserve life arise when the use of the means is disproportionately 
burdensome in the situation or when death is imminent in spite of the means 
used. 
V. Conclusion 
This analysis should throw light on the moral dimensions of your 
implementation of advance directives. I present this letter to assist you in 
understanding Catholic moral teaching and to enable you to reject certain 
misunderstandings of that teaching. It should. not represent a departure 
from your customary practices, but should provide the intellectual and 
Catholic grounds for practices which respect and defend the sanctity of 
human life, despite the miseries and sufferings to which it is susceptible. 
I offer this direction in order that you might maintain your catholicity in 
the face of a legal and social environment which embraces other principles . 
The Catholic Church has consistently exhibited a moral tradition 
independent of the legal and social circumstances within which it lives. 
Today, the federal government provides for us an occasion to exercise 
moral leadership through articulating our principles upholding the sanctity 
of human life in contrast to the political and legal structures which, at times , 
would permit its neglect. Since the courts have not dealt finally with these 
questions, visible adherence to our principles has no small influence , for we 
draw upon a tradition older and a teaching more profound than the law. 
Catholic moral leadership in the field of healthcare is essential to defend and 
promote the non-sectarian truth of human life. 
Given at my Chancery September 14, 1991 , the Feast of the Triumph of 
the Cross. 
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principles, the facility may not comply. Responsibility here rests ultimately, though not 
normally personally, with the Administrator. To refuse compliance is not to judge the 
subjective moral dimensions of the patient's decision. It is a recognition of the moral nature 
of the healthcare facility and of the need for it to be morally responsible to its mission, to its 
patients, and to the teachings of the Church. 
23. "M ust do so conscientiously" seems to be an under-translation. The Latin text reads: 
"omni cum diligentia operam suam praestare debent." (The Italian text is equivalent to the 
Latin: "devono prestare /a foro opera con ogni diligenza. ") The official Latin text is clearly 
stronger than the translation. 
24. A duty to care for health must also be, afortiori. a duty to care for life. 
25 . As the "Declaration" goes on to clarify, this appies to "the normal means that 
medicine can offer" as opposed to "the means provided by the most advanced medical 
techniques, even if these means are still at the experimental stage and are not without a 
certain risk." The latter category of means are considered normally optional, although 
occasionally, the extraordinariness of the circumstances of the 'case may warrant measures 
beyond what is strictly obligatory in the preservation of life. Such circumstances include 
pregnancy, alleged crime, alleged malpractice, and genuine uncertainty in the mind of the 
person or persons with whom the authority for decisions rests. 
26. The Latin text qualifies the word for "burdensome" with the adverb "nimis. "Thus, it 
is clear that this statement refers not to those techniques which carry any risk or any burden, 
but to those which carry risk or burden disproportionate to their results. . 
27. "Semper" (Latin) and "sempre" (Italian) are not translated into the English text. 
28. The Latin text is more emphatic than either the Italian or English: "Imminente morte. 
quae remediis adhibitis nullo modo impediri potest". 
29. This connection is obvious in the English and Italian ('i1 pro/ungar'si di una vita 
infelice"; "pro/ungamento precario e penoso della vita") versions of the text. The Latin 
version supports the parallel, although the terms used are not the same: "infelicis vitae 
prorogatio"; "precariam et d%ris p/enam vitae di/ationem"). 
30. In this context, let it be stated once more that the moral standing of the healthcare 
facility is not determined entirely by the wishes of the patient. After the patient has reached a 
decision concerning the course of treatment, the healthcare facility remains bound to assess 
the moral implications of its own cooperation in the decisions of the patient. 
31. The complexities which make this issue difficult to understand may also contribute to 
reducing or removing altogether any culpability, should an individual commit an error of 
judgment. 
32. Nutrition and hydration are here treated as if there were no difference in their 
provision. This is an editorial convenience. It must be recognized that it may be the case 
medically that the provision of caloric nutrients may create complications which the 
provision of water does not. At such times, their provision should be regarded as separate 
life-preserving means. 
33. It may be helpful to consider the distinction between keeping alive someone who is 
unconscious and keeping unconscious someone who is alive. The former may be achieved 
through artificial nutrition and hydration, for example, while the latter is achieved through 
any means which imposes unconsciousness. 
34. This classifies the means of artificial nutrition and hydration among "the normal 
means that medicine can offer" as opposed to "the most advanced techniques," in the terms 
of the "Declaration." Means of artificial nutrition and hydration which normally can be 
maintained through skilled nursing are certainly among "the normal means that medicine· 
can offer," given the state of care which can be expected from a professional healthcare 
facility . 
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